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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Was the plaintiff entitled to a res ipsa loquitur 
instruction when the evidence at trial did not fully reveal all 
the facts and circumstances surrounding his injury, specifically 
the origin and location of the sponge which precipitated the 
defendants1 performance of an unnecessary second operation? 
2. Were defendants negligent as a matter of law where they 
performed an admittedly needless operation without taking simple 
and readily performed measures to determine whether the operation 
was necessary? 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Pursuant to the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, plaintiff-
appellant files this petition and requests a grant of a Writ of 
Certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court, Plaintiff-appellants 
petition for Writ of Certiorari follows a decision in the Utah 
Court of Appeals, Case No. 860023-CA, filed May 12, 1987. This 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-5 (Supp. 
1986). 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action based upon the subjection of the plaintiff 
to unnecessary risk and injury by needless surgery performed by 
the defendants, Dr. Rowe and Dr. Bristow. On June 23, 1981, the 
defendant doctors, following the removal of an acute gangrenous 
perforated gallbladder, examined x-rays taken of the plaintiff and 
noted that a surgical sponge was visible on the x-rays. Without 
taking any further x-rays and even though the sponge count 
indicated that no sponge had been left in plaintiff, the plaintiff 
was taken back to the operating room for removal of the surgical 
sponge. No sponge was located. 
Plaintiff brought suit against the defendant doctors, the 
radiologist, and Mountain View Hospital on the theory that the 
defendants breached their duty of ordinary care owed to the 
plaintiff resulting in the plaintiff»s injury. 
COURSE AND DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURTS 
The matter came to trial on December 27, 1983, in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, Utah, J. Robert 
Bullock, District Judge, presiding. Defendant Dr. Monnahan was 
dismissed at pre-trial without objection by the other defendants. 
Plaintiff moved to dismiss the defendant Mountain View Hospital 
prior to the commencement of the trial. Defendants Rowe and 
Bristow objected and the court refused to dismiss the hospital. 
The court dismissed the defendant hospital at the conclusion of 
the plaintiff's case and directed a verdict in favor of the 
hospital. The case was submitted for jury deliberation on special 
verdict December 27, 1983. The jury found the remaining two 
doctor defendants not negligent and judgment was entered on 
January 5, 1984, in favor of the defendants and against the 
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plaintiff, no cause for action. On April 16, 1984, the trial 
court denied plaintiff's motion for a new trial, and plaintiff 
subsequently appealed to this Court. Plaintiff's appeal was 
assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals, Case No. 860023-CA, and set 
for hearing on April 27, 1987. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed 
the judgment of the trial court in an opinion filed May 12, 1987. 
Roylance v. Rowe, 57 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Ct. App. 1987). A copy of 
the opinion is attached hereto as Appendix "A". 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 22, 1981, it was determined that the plaintiff, 
Erling Roylance, who was then 74 years of age, was suffering from 
a kidney stone. (R. 474). On June 13, 1981, surgery to remove 
the stone, "proximal ureteral lithotomy," was performed by the 
defendant, Dr. Dean L. Bristow. (R. 473-76). Within days 
following the operation the plaintiff became increasingly ill and 
was transferred to the Intensive Care Unit (R. 481-82), and it was 
determined that an additional operation was necessary. (R. 495-
99). Dr. Rowe, a general surgeon, was consulted (R. 499) and on 
June 22, 1981, at 11:30 p.m., an emergency surgery was performed 
by Drs. Rowe and Bristow for the purpose of removing an acute 
gangrenous perforated gallbladder. (R. 437, 499, 505-06, 763. 1). 
As is standard procedure, prior to the initial incision the 
scrub nurse counted the "sponges." The "sponges" are actually a 
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radio-opaque gauze and in this instance were approximately a 4" x 
4" size. (R. 429, 432). Just before completing the operation, 
another sponge count was taken. Typically, and in this instance, 
a count is taken just prior to the closing of the peritoneum, 
which is about three layers below the skin. (R. 435, 438). 
Another count was completed during the closing of the fascia, 
which is about two layers from the skin. The circulating nurse 
counted the used sponges and the scrub nurse counted the sponges 
not used. The figures were totaled and matched the pre-incision 
count. (R. 435-36, 438). The count was again correct. (R. 439). 
Upon completion of surgery the doctors closed the plaintiff's 
incision and he was then taken to the Intensive Care Unit in good 
condition, asleep from the anesthesia. (R. 511, 553). 
While the patient was still in the Intensive Care Unit, Dr. 
Bristow ordered an x-ray to be taken of the bladder area to 
ascertain the position of the catheter. This x-ray was taken at 
2:32 a.m. (R. 415-16, 451, 511). Minutes later the x-ray was 
developed. (R. 512-13). A second x-ray was taken at 2:42 a.m. 
(R. 415, 417, 453, 511). 
In addition to that which the doctors expected to see, there 
appeared on both x-rays a sponge marker indicating the presence of 
4M x 4" piece of gauze. (R. 514, 517). The doctors, fearful that 
the sponge had been left within the patient, proceeded to check 
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At this point the patient was still under anesthesia and in 
critically ill condition. (R. 518)• Defendants conceded that 
another x-ray creates insignificant risk as opposed to an ex-
ploratory operation, (R. 520, 533, 536, 757), especially where the 
patient is critically ill. (R. 536). The mere induction of 
additional anesthesia is potentially hazardous. (R. 527). 
The doctors approached the plaintiff's family and indicated 
their assumption that a sponge had been left within the patient. 
The doctors explained that the plaintiff was still asleep due to 
the anesthesia and that they wanted to return the plaintiff-
patient to surgery, open up the original incision and search for 
the sponge. (R. 520-21, 553) . 
The nurse who had completed the original sponge count 
received a telephone call from the anesthesiologist and was 
advised that the original sponge count was incorrect. The nurse 
responded that the count was correct, but returned to the hospital 
to assist in the subsequent operation. (R. 440). 
The subsequent operation took place from approximately 3:30 
a.m. to 5:00 a.m. (R. 525, 601). The doctors failed to locate any 
sponge or gauze. (R. 441, 523-24). The doctors called for a 
portable x-ray machine and while still in the operating room took 
additional x-rays at approximately 4:15 a.m. (R. 415, 442, 462, 
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THE EVIDENCE RECEIVED AT TRIAL DOES NOT FULLY REVEAL 
ALL OF THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE INJURY. 
Plaintiff claimed error in the trial court's refusal to 
instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur. The Court of Appeals 
acknowledged that plaintiff had met the general prerequisites for 
application of res ipsa loquitur, but held that use of the 
doctrine was precluded in this case because the plaintiff's proof 
was too detailed. This decision of the Court of Appeals is 
contrary to previously established Utah law. 
This Court has clearly defined the circumstances under which 
a party is entitled to a res ipsa loquitur instruction: 
Such circumstances, which have been defined by 
law, are (1) that the accident was of a kind 
which, in the ordinary course of events, would 
not have happened had due care been observed; 
(2) that the plaintiff's own use or operation 
of the ajency or instrumentality was not 
primarily responsible for the injuries; and 
(3) that the agency or instrumentality causing 
the injury was under the exclusive management 
or control of the defendant. 
Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828, 833 (Utah 1980). 
In deciding whether the facts warrant such an instruction, 
doubts are to be resolved in favor of giving the instruction. Id. 
The Court of Appeals apparently assumed that these elements 
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had been met, but held that the case came within an exception to 
the general rule: 
Application of res ipsa loquitur is, 
however, premised on the plaintiff's inability 
to produce evidence identifying the precise 
negligent act or omission on the part of a 
defendant which caused the harm. There is no 
room for the operation of res ipsa loquitur 
where the evidence in the case reveals all of 
the facts and circumstances of the occurrence 
and clearly establishes the precise allegedly 
negligent act which is the cause of plain-
tiff's injury. See Kusy v. K-Mart Apparel 
Fashion Corp., 681 P.2d 1232, 1236 (Utah 
1984). See also Crawford v. Rogers, 406 P.2d 
189, 193 (Alaska 1965); Ballhorst v. Hahner-
Forman-Cale, Inc.. [sic: Foreman] 207 Kan. 89, 
99, 484 P.2d 38, 46 (1971); Hugo v. Manning. 
201 Kan. 391, 395-98, 441 P.2d 145, 149-51 
(1968); Dabroe v. Rhodes Co., 64 Wash, [sic: 
Wash.2d] 431, 392 P.2d 317, 322 (1964). 
57 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35, slip op. at 3. 
The Utah Court of Appeals thereafter concluded that "inasmuch 
as the evidence introduced by Roylance clearly and completely 
delineated how Roylance's injuries occurred, the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur has no application, as there is nothing left to 
infer." Id. at 36; slip op. at 4. 
This conclusion is based on the doctors admitting "that a 
second surgery was performed to remove what appeared to be a 
sponge left inside the defendant [sic]; they do not deny that this 
surgery was performed following a correct sponge count but after a 
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suspicious x-ray; tley do not deny that the subsequent operation 
failed to locate any sponge or gauze." Id. 
As the Court of Appeals states it, "the issue remains 
whether at trial Roylance offered evidence of specific negligence 
so as to fully explain the alleged negligent cause of injury." 
Id. Plaintiff acknowledges that the foregoing facts admitted by 
the defendants are evidence of specific negligence, however, those 
facts do not fully explain the alleged negligent cause of injury. 
The defendants subjected the plaintiff to the second surgery 
based upon what was seen in the original x-rays taken following 
the first surgery. If a sponge had not shown up in those x-rays, 
there would have been no second surgery. The second surgery was, 
therefore, directly related to the sponge observed in the original 
x-rays. The sponge seen on those original x-rays was, however, 
never found. The parties to this suit do not know from whence 
came the sponge that appeared on the original x-rays. They never 
knew the whereabouts of the sponge on the original x-rays. They 
cannot explain why the sponge was never found upon the reopening 
of the incision. 
In sum, the parties did not and could not reveal all the 
facts and circumstances surrounding the negligent cause of injury. 
If all the facts had been conclusively established, including the 
exact location of the sponge, then the doctors would not have 
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performed the second surgery and appellant would not have been 
injured. 
Although plaintiff does not know what caused a gauze to 
appear on the x-rays nor what happened to that gauze, plaintiff 
was penalized for what he did know. This problem was explained by 
the Supreme Court of Kansas in Hugo v. Manning, 201 Kan. 391, 441 
P.2d 145 (1968), cited by the Court of Appeals: 
However, there is no reason in law why a 
plaintiff may not offer such evidence as may 
be available tending to show specifically the 
items of negligence and still rely upon the 
inference also permitted under res ipsa 
loquitur. A number of different causes or 
inferences may thus be left to the final 
determination of the triers of the facts. . . 
We think that in cases in which a plaintiff 
is entitled to rely on the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur, he should not be penalized by 
the loss of a presumption because he has been 
willing to go forward and do the best he can 
to prove specific acts of negligence. On the 
contrary, he should be encouraged to give the 
court, the jury, and even the defendant the 
benefit of whatever facts, if any, his effort 
may develop toward revealing the specific 
causes of the mishap. 
441 P.2d at 151. 
Application of this rule is illustrated by the Utah case of 
Kusy v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corp., 681 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1984), 
also cited by the Court of Appeals. The plaintiff in that case 
was injured while unloading shrubs from his truck at a K-Mart 
store. The plaintiff had been loading the shrubs on a pallet 
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provided by K-Mart held on a fork lift operated by a K-Mart 
employee. The pallet broke, causing the plaintiff to fall and 
injure himself. The plaintiff sued on two theories, (1) negligent 
failure to inspect the pallets, and (2) negligent maintenance of 
the pallets. K-Mart had admitted that it had failed to inspect 
the pallets. There was also evidence, apparently undisputed, that 
the pallets were stacked on K-Martfs premises in an unprotected 
area where they were sometimes run over by motor vehicles. 
Under the circumstances in Kusy, this Court held that a res 
ipsa instruction would not be appropriate under the negligent 
failure to inspect doctrine, because all the facts were known. 
Under the negligent maintenance theory, however, the Court held 
that a res ipsa instruction should have been given. Although 
there was evidence of specific acts of negligent maintenance by 
the defendant, there was no clear demonstration of the cause of 
the defect in the pallet that broke. 681 P.2d at 1236. 
The Utah Court of Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P. 2d 348 (Utah 
1980), also establishes that an instruction on res ipsa loquitur 
should have been given in the instant matter. In that case, the 
undisputed evidence established that the doctors had performed a 
surgical procedure on the plaintiff while she was under anes-
thesia, that a needle had become disengaged from its needle holder 
during the surgery, and that the doctors failed to remove the 
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needle or disclose the existence of it to the plaintiff. This 
Court held under these circumstances that the giving of a res ipsa 
loquitur instruction was appropriate. 
Application of the doctrine is also illustrated in the Kansas 
case of Ballhorst v. Hahner-Forman-Cale, Inc., 207 Kan. 89, 484 
P.2d 38 (1971), also cited by the Court of Appeals. In that case, 
the defendant was injured by the collapse of a block wall being 
constructed by the defendant. The undisputed evidence established 
that gusty winds prevailing in the area could blow down that type 
of wall, and that bracing was necessary. The evidence further 
established that defendants had removed part of the bracing prior 
to the accident. The manner in which the wall was constructed and 
the amount and nature of the bracing were all exclusively under 
the control of the defendant. The plaintiff was therefore able to 
prove all of the specific acts of negligence by the defendant 
except the actual nechanics of how the wall fell. Under these 
circumstances, the Supreme Court of Kansas rejected the defen-
dant's contention that res ipsa loquitur was not appropriate. 
In the instant case, there was no dispute that the x-rays 
showed a sponge marker, that the subsequent operation failed to 
disclose the sponge, and that the operation was therefore unneces-
sary. The evidence did not reveal, however, the location of the 
sponge which appeared on the x-rays. Plaintiff was no able to 
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fully explain the cause of his injury* An instruction on res ipsa 
loquitur should have been given, and the Court of Appeals' failure 
to so hold is clearly contrary to existing Utah law. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANTS WERE NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The Court of Appeals stated that the record in this case 
"contains ample evidence to support the jury's finding that the 
doctors were not negligent." 57 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35; slip op. at 
2. The Court of Appeals does not, however, identify the evidence 
on which it bases this conclusion. Plaintiff asserts that the 
evidence in this case admits of no conclusion but that the 
defendants were negligent as a matter of law. 
The undisputed evidence in this case established that post 
surgery x-rays showed the existence of a sponge marker. The 
marker appears in a neat, straight line, not as one would expect 
had the sponge been lost in a body cavity. The evidence further 
showed that such an x-ray could not establish that a sponge was in 
the body, but that an additional x-ray from a lateral view would 
be required to establish whether the sponge was actually inside 
the body and the exact location of the sponge. Rather than have 
such an x-ray taken, however, which would have been a simple 
procedure, the doctors instead performed a second operation on a 
critically ill patient in an attempt to locate the sponge. 
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These facts acTmit of no explanation other than that the 
doctors were negligent. The plaintiff clearly had no part in the 
circumstances leading to the second operation, because he was 
under anesthesia the entire time. This Court has held that the 
leaving of a foreign object in a body cavity is something which 
jurors can determine to be negligent without expert testimony. 
Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980). With even 
greater certainty one must conclude that the performance of an 
operation to remove a sponge which apparently did not exist is 
negligence as a matter of law. 
Plaintiff has not been able to discover any cases dealing 
with an operation to remove a foreign object which did not exist. 
Plaintiff acknowledges that in Nixdorf, supra, the court held that 
the leaving of a foreign object in a body cavity did not con-
stitute negligence as a matter of law. In that case, however, 
there was evidence that metal objects are frequently placed or 
left in body cavities without adverse side affects. 612 P.2d at 
357 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In the instant case, however, the 
issue is not whether it was negligent to leave something in the 
body cavity, because nothing was left in the plaintiff. The issue 
is rather whether it was negligent as a matter of law to perform 
surgery to remove a foreign object which did not exist, where the 
taking of a second x-ray would have readily revealed that the 
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foreign object was not located in the body. Plaintiff respect-
fully submits that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to hold 
that the doctors were negligent as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
The known and unknown factors of the instant case call forth 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The instrumentality or agency 
which proximately caused injury to the plaintiff was in the 
possession of and under the exclusive control of the defendant 
doctors at the time the cause of the injury was set in motion, and 
it appeared that the injury resulted from some act or omission 
incident to the defendants1 responsibility to use due care. Mr. 
Roylance was returned to surgery to search for a sponge, after a 
correct sponge count. The doctors failed to take a subsequent x-
ray to determine the locality of the sponge. The appellant could 
not fully reveal all of the facts and circumstances surrounding 
the accident. The location and origin of the sponge was never 
accounted for by either party. The facts in the instant case, 
therefore, present exactly the type of circumstances which give 
rise to the plaintifffs right to utilize the theory of res ipsa 
loquitur. The trial courtfs failure to so instruct the jury 
constituted reversible error. 
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DATED this 11th day of June, 1987. 
S. REX LEWIS and 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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foregoing was mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 11th 
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Plaintiff Roylance brought an action against Doctors Rowe 
and Bristow, and Mountain View Hospital for medical malpractice 
arising from surgery performed in June, 1981. At the 
conclusion of Roylance's case-in-chief/ defendant Mountain View 
Hospital was dismissed. Subsequently, the jury found the 
remaining two doctor defendants not negligent and judgment was 
entered in favor of defendants, no cause of action. Roylance 
seeks reversal claiming the trial court erred (a) in not 
granting a directed verdict in favor of plaintiff and in 
failing to allow a new trial based upon the weight of the 
evidence; (b) in denying plaintiffs requested jury instruction 
on res ipsa loquitur; and (c) in failing to dismiss defendant 
hospital at the commencement of trial. We affirm. 
Roylance entered Mountain View Hospital for removal of an 
acute gangrenous perforated gallbladder. The emergency surgery 
was performed by Drs. Rowe and Bristow. Following the surgery, 
the scrub nurse counted the sponges; the figures totaled and 
matched the initial count. After the doctors closed Roylance's 
incision, an x-ray was taken which revealed the presence of a 
4" x 4H piece of gauze. The doctors checked Roylance1s 
external bandages and bed clothes and finding nothing, 
determined a sponge had been left internally. The doctors 
thereafter performed another operation to locate the sponge or 
gauze; no sponge or gauze was located. This action was brought 
against Drs. Rowe and Bristow and Mountain View Hospital on 
grounds that Roylance was subjected to unnecessary surgery. 
Following a pre-trial settlement and release of Mountain 
View Hospital, Roylance unsuccessfully moved to dismiss 
Mountain View Hospital, The court, however, dismissed the 
hospital at the conclusion of Roylance's case-in-chief and 
directed a verdict in the hospital's favor. At the conclusion 
of the trial against the remaining two doctors, the court 
denied Roylance's requested jury instruction on res ipsa 
loquitur but submitted the issue of the defendants' negligence 
to the jury. The jury found the doctors were not negligent. 
The court then denied Roylance's motion for a new trial. 
I. 
Roylance first contends there was insufficient evidence to 
justify the jury's verdict of no cause of action on negligence 
and, therefore, the trial court erred in failing to grant 
Roylance's motion for a new trial. The law on this point is 
well established. Where the trial court has denied a motion 
for a new trial based upon insufficiency of evidence to justify 
the verdict, its decision will be sustained on appeal if there 
was an evidentiary basis for the jury's decision. The trial 
court's denial of the motion will be reversed only if the 
evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or so 
slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly 
unreasonable and unjust. Nelson v. Truiillo. 657 P.2d 730, 732 
(Utah 1982); £££ Hall v. Anderson. 562 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1977). 
The trial record contains ample evidence to support the 
jury's finding that the doctors were not negligent. We do not 
find the evidence supporting the jury's finding so lacking or 
unconvincing as to make the verdict unreasonable or unjust. 
II. 
Roylance next contends the trial court erred in failing to 
give the jury an instruction on res ipsa loquitur. Res ipsa 
loquitur is an evidentiary doctrine aiding in the proof of 
negligence. Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828, 834 (Utah 
1980). The purpose of res ipsa loquitur is 
to permit one who suffers injury from 
something under the control of another, 
which ordinarily would not cause injury 
except for the other's negligence, to 
present his grievance to a court or jury 
on the basis that an inference of 
negligence may reasonably be drawn from 
such facts; and cast the burden upon the 
other to make proof of what happened. 
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J&. at 833 (emphasis added) (citing Lund v. Phillips Petroleum 
££., 10 Utah 2d 276, 351 P.2d 952 (I960); £££ also Joseph v. wt 
H. Groves Latter Dav Saint Hospital, 10 Utah 2d 94, 348 P.2d 
935 (1960); White v Pinnev, 99 Utah 484, 108 P.2d 249 (1940). 
A res ipsa loquitur instruction is appropriate where a 
plaintiff is unable to pinpoint which act or omission on the 
part of a defendant breached a legally imposed standard of 
care.1 
Before being entitled to such a jury instruction, however, 
a plaintiff must show: 
(1) [T]hat the accident was of a kind 
which, in the ordinary course of events, 
would not have happened had due care been 
observed; (2) that the plaintiff's own 
use or operation of the agency or 
instrumentality was not primarily 
responsible for the injury; and (3) that 
the agency or instrumentality causing the 
injury was under the exclusive management 
or control of the defendant. 
Kusy v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corp.. 681 P.2d 1232, 1235 (Utah 
1984) (citing Anderton, 607 P.2d at 833). 
Application of res ipsa loquitur is, however, premised on 
the plaintiffs inability to produce evidence identifying the 
precise negligent act or omission on the part of a defendant 
which caused the harm. There is no room for the operation of 
res ipsa loquitur where the evidence in the case reveals all of 
the facts and circumstances of the occurrence and clearly 
establishes the precise allegedly negligent act which is the 
cause of plaintiffs injury. See Kusy v. K-Mart Apparel 
Fashion Corp., 681 P.2d 1232, 1236 (Utah 1984). See also 
Crawford v. Rogers, 406 P.2d 189, 193 (Alaska 1965); Ballhorst 
v. Hahner-Forman-Cale. Inc.. 207 Kan. 89, 99, 484 P.2d 38, 46 
(1971); Hugo v. Manning, 201 Kan. 391, 395-98, 441 P.2d 145, 
149-51 (1968); Dabroe v. Rhodes Co.. 64 Wash. 431, 392 P.2d 
317, 322 (1964). 
This does not mean that introduction of evidence of 
specific acts of negligence deprives a plaintiff of the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. This jurisdiction has long held 
1. Although in the majority of medical malpractice cases, the 
plaintiff must introduce expert testimony to establish the 
standard of care, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized certain 
situations where expert testimony is unnecessary. Nixdorf v. 
Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980). We do not reach the 
issue in this case. 
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that a case presented to the jury on specific theories of 
negligence does not preclude an instruction on a theory of res 
ipsa loquitur- Anaerman Co. v, Edcremon. 76 Utah 394, 400, 290 
P. 169, 172 (1930). Rather, the rule may be summarized as 
follows: Where the three conditions for application of res 
ipsa loquitur have been established, a mere prima facia showing 
of specific negligence does not prevent its use. Under such 
circumstances the case should be submitted on both the theory 
of specific negligence and res ipsa loquitur. Thus, if proof 
by a plaintiff of specific acts of negligence on the 
defendant's part does not furnish a complete explanation of the 
accident, as where there are alternative theories of 
negligence, there is still room for an inference of negligence 
arising from the happening of the accident. Where, however, 
proof of specific negligence goes so far as to reveal all the 
facts and circumstances and fully explain the alleged negligent 
cause of injury by positive evidence, res ipsa loquitur has no 
function. Kusy, 681 P.2d at 1236. 
In the case before us, Roylance argues that the second, 
unnecessary surgery was an accident which would not have 
happened had due care been observed, that Roylance was not 
responsible for the injury, and that the instrumentality 
causing the injury was under the exclusive control of the 
defendant doctors. Roylance concludes that, inasmuch as the 
three conditions of res ipsa loquitur have been satisfied, the 
court should have instructed on the doctrine. As the foregoing 
discussion makes clear, however, our analysis must not end. 
The issue remains whether at trial Roylance offered evidence of 
specific negligence so as to fully explain the alleged 
negligent cause of injury. If the evidence received at trial 
fully revealed all of the facts and circumstances surrounding 
the accident, res ipsa loquitur has no application. 
In this case, there is no dispute that the injury, the 
unnecessary second surgery, was caused by the defendant 
doctors. The doctors do not deny that a second surgery was 
performed to remove what appeared to be a sponge left inside 
the defendant; they do not deny that this surgery was performed 
following a correct sponge count but after a suspicious x-ray; 
they do not deny that the subsequent operation failed to locate 
any sponge or gauze. Inasmuch as the evidence introduced by 
Roylance clearly and completely delineated how Roylance1s 
injuries occurred, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has no 
application, as there is nothing left to infer. The jury was 
only required to determine if this conduct breached the 
requisite standard of care. The court therefore did not err in 
refusing to give Roylance1s proposed instruction on res ipsa 
loquitur. In view of this conclusion, it is unnecessary to 
consider the other points raised by respondents. 
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III. 
Finally, Roylance contends the trial court erred in failing 
to dismiss defendant hospital at the commencement of trial. 
Prior to the commencement of trial, Roylance entered into a 
settlement agreement with defendant Mountain View Hospital 
relieving the hospital from liability to make contribution to 
the doctors pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-43 (1977).2 
Roylance moved to dismiss defendant Mountain View Hospital; 
defendant doctors argued that under § 78-27-43 Mountain View 
Hospital could not be dismissed from the action until the issue 
of proportionate fault had been litigated. The court denied 
Roylance1s motion and compelled Mountain View Hospital to 
remain a defendant until the completion of Roylance*s case. 
The pertinent section of the Utah Code provides: 
(1) A release by the injured person of one 
joint tort-feasor does not relieve him 
from liability to make contribution to 
another joint tort-feasor unless that 
release: 
(a) Is given before the right of the 
other tort-feasor to secure a money 
judgment for contribution has 
accrued; and 
(b) Provides for a reduction, to the 
extent of the prorata share of the 
released tort-feasor, of the injured 
person's damages recoverable against 
all the other tort-feasors. 
(2) This section shall apply only if the 
issue of proportionate fault is litigated 
between joint tort-feasors in the same 
action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-43 (1977). 
Roylance could relieve defendant Mountain View Hospital 
from liability for contribution only under the express 
provisions of § 78-27-43. Madsen v. Salt Lake Citv School Bd., 
645 P.2d 658, 663 (Utah 1982); See Thode, Comparative 
Negligence, Contribution Among Tort-Feasors, and the Effect of 
2. This case was decided prior to the 1986 modification of 
provisions relating to comparative negligence which, among • 
other things, abolished joint and several liability and rights 
of contribution among joint tort-feasors. Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-27-38 to -43 (1986). 
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a Release—A Triple Plav bv the Utah Legislature. 1973 Utah L. 
Rev. 406, 431-33. As noted, this section specifically states 
that it shall apply only if proportionate fault is litigated 
between joint tort-feasors in the same action, as only then can 
the plaintiff's judgment be proportionately reduced by the 
released tort-feasor's established fault. 
Roylance cannot claim the benefits of § 78-27-43 to release 
Mountain View Hospital from liability to make contribution and 
at the same time deny defendant doctors the right to litigate 
the hospital's proportionate fault. The trial court did not 
err in denying Roylance's motion to dismiss Mountain View 
Hospital at the commencement of trial. 
Judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs to 
respondent. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
R. W. Garff, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
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